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SPEECH, SPOUSES, AND STANDING:
IS THERE STANDING TO SUE WHEN
SANCTIONS THREATENED AGAINST ONE'S
SPOUSE CHILL PROTECTED EXPRESSION?
Abstract:, When a public employee's spouse forgoes expression protected
by the First Amendment for fear of direct, employment-related sanctions
against the public employee, the spouse has suffered a chilling injury.
Courts are split on whether such injuries constitute injuries in fact
sufficient for standing, however. This Note explores chilling injuries as a
basis for standing and suggests that the tests courts employ to determine
whether chilling injuries are injuries in fact are inconsistently applied and
inadequately protect First Amendment rights. This Note argues that
courts should focus on the choice at the heart of any chilling injury: the
choice between forgoing protected expression or suffering consequences.
One should have standing to sue when government action forces one to
make an intolerably difficult choice of whether to engage in protected
expression.
INTRODUCTION
Alma Mendez-Thompson was politically active and had partici-
pated in a number of political campaigns.' After moving to Missouri,
however, she resisted getting involved in local politics out of fear that
her political activities would endanger her husband's career. 2 A provi-
sion in the city charter prohibited Ms. Mendez-Thompson's husband, a
city employee, from engaging directly or indirectly in local politics, 3 Ms.
Mendez-Thompson and her husband sued to challenge the provision. 4
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in In-
ternational Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, denied Ms.
Mendez-Thompson standing. 3 The district court concluded that be-
cause Ms. Mendez-Thompson could not be personally subject to di-
rect disciplinary action, she failed to allege an injury in fact required
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003) (mem.).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 971.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 972.
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for standing. 6
 The district court concluded that because disciplinary
action against Mr. Thompson would only indirectly affect Ms. Men-
dez-Thompson, she could raise only, derivatively, the same claims as
Mr. Thompson.? Because the district court upheld the challenged
provision as applied to Mr. Thompson, Ms. Mendez-Thompson's
claim likewise failed.°
In March 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and granted standing to Ms. Mendez-Thompson. 9 Although
directly applicable only to the state employee, the court found that
the prohibitions injured Ms. Mendez-Thompson by deterring her ex-
ercise of First Amendment rights." By holding this injury an injury in
fact sufficient for standing, the Eighth Circuit split with the Fourth,
• Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal, which had denied stand-
ing in very similar circumstances. 11
 Such disagreements over standing
issues are not uncommon; standing doctrine is widely acknowledged
to be inconsistently and unpredictably applied. 12
Although the appliCation of standing doctrine may be confused,
its requirements are easily stated." To bring a case in federal court, a
plaintiff must show that the actions of the defendant inflicted an in-
jury in fact that a court could redress by a favorable ruling." Despite
this simple formulation, where injuries alleged are novel or indirect,
inconsistent case law provides little concrete guidance. 16
The difficulty of determining exactly what sorts of injuries consti-
tute injuries in fact is particularly acute when a plaintiff alleges injury
due to a chilling effect." A chilling effect occurs when government
8
 See Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972.
7 See id. at 975.
8 See id.
9 Id. at 975-76.
10 Id. at 975.
" Ina ASA of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 975 (disagreeing expressly and with a firm con-
viction" with the conclusions reached by the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeals); see Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 1999); Horstkoetter v.
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1279 (10th Cir. 1998); English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727,
730 (4th Cir. 1979).
12
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSITEUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.5.1, at
60 (2d ed. 1985).
13 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
14 /d.
1' See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 301, 302-04 (2002).
16
 The few U.S. Supreme Court cases to consider the issue have left many unanswered
questions. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473 (1987) (leaving unanswered the question
of what evidence is sufficient to make an alleged chill objective); Socialist Workers Party v.
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actions or regulations discourage expression protected by the First
Amendment without directly regulating it. 17 Because chilling injuries
are, by nature, indirect, courts may find them insufficient to meet the
injury in fact required for standing in the federal courts. 18 Case law
provides few clear answers as to which chilling injuries a court should
find sufficient for standing. 19
This Note examines barriers to standing faced by spouses of pub-
lic employees who allege chilling injuries due to abridgements of pub-
lic employee speech." In particular, it considers the different ap-
proaches taken by the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appea1. 21 Part I examines chilling injuries generally. 22 Part II
addresses standing doctrine generally, its requirements, and the ra-
tionales behind them." Part III discusses the application of standing
doctrine to chilling injuries in the U.S. Supreme Court. 24 Part IV dis-
cusses chilling injuries as a basis for standing in lower federal courts. 25
Part V addresses the issue dividing the Eighth from the Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, namely, whether fear that one's
protected speech will result in disciplinary action against one's spouse
constitutes a chilling injury sufficient for standing. 2° Finally, Part VI
proposes that standing should be granted to plaintiffs able to show
that government action forced an objectively difficult choice between
forgoing protected rights and triggering harm. 27
I. CHILLING EFFECTS GENERALLY
Government sanctions imposed on a public employee do not di-
rectly subject the public employee's spouse to government regulation
Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974) (leaving unanswered what would be required
for standing in other circumstances); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (leaving
unanswered whether. objective chills are sufficient for standing); infra notes 65-124 and
accompanying text.
17 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978).
15 See, e.g., Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstkoctter, 159 F.3d at 1279; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
10 See infra notes 65-124 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 125-173 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 125-173 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 65-92 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
" See infin notes 125-173 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 174-250 and accompanying text.
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or action.28
 Nevertheless, sanctions against public employees triggered
by their spouses' exercise of protected expression may deter the
spouses' expression. 29
 To obtain standing, the spouse must show that
this deterrent or chilling effect was an injury in fact."
The concept of a First Amendment chill first emerged in Justice
Felix Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff. 31
 A chilling
effect occurs when government action or regulation deters expression
protected by the First Amendment, while not directly prohibiting it."
For example, fear that engaging in the protected activity will subject
one's spouse to employment-related sanctions may result in a chilling
effect. 33
 Although most cases of chilling effects may result from gov-
ernment regulation, a chilling effect may also occur as a result of non-
regulatory government action such as surveillance. 34
The recognition of chilling effects indicates the high value
placed on expression protected by the First Amendment. 35 The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized that free expression is "supremely
precious" but "delicate and vulnerable."36
 The concept of First
Amendment chill reflects the high societal value placed on free ex-
pression by recognizing that even indirect effects of government regu-
lation or action limy abridge expression. 37
28 Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003) (stating that provisions applicable only to city em-
ployees clearly do not apply to their spouses).
29 Id. at 972, 975 (wife of firefighter deterred from political involvement because of
fear of employment sanctions against her husband); Biggs v Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d
989, 997-98 (9th Cir. 1999) (husband and daughter of associate in publicly-employed law
firm deterred from political campaigning by government's threat to fire the firm unless
the husband and daughter were "silenced"); Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d
1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998) (wives of state troopers deterred from displaying political signs
by threats of disciplinary action against their husbands).
30 See Ine'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 973.
31
 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
ss Schauer, supra note 17, at 693.
" See Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972, 975; Biggs, 189 F.3d at 997-98; Harstkoetter,
159 F.3d at 1269.
54
 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1316, 1319 (1974)
(plaintiffs alleged that FBI surveillance of a political convention chilled attendance and
free debate); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1972) (plaintiffs alleged that Army surveil-
lance chilled their exercise of civilian political activity).
' See Schauer, supra note 17, at 688.
36
 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
" See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE I.J. 853, 867-68 (1991).
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II. STANDING DOCTRINE GENERALLY
Understanding the hurdles faced by litigants seeking standing to
sue for chilling injuries requires a general knowledge of standing doc-
trine, its requirements, and its rationales." Whether a public em-
ployee's spouse has standing to challenge a regulation imposing sanc-
tions on the public employee for the spouse's speech hinges on
whether the spouse has suffered an injury in fact." This discussion
therefore focuses on standing doctrine's injury-in-fact requirement. 4°
Standing is a threshold issue.'" Before a federal court can hear a
case on the merits, litigants must show that they are the proper parties
to bring suit. 42 Courts derive current standing doctrine from Article
III of the U.S. Constitution, which grants the federal judiciary the
power to hear "cases and controversies," and, by implication, nothing
else.43 Where a plaintiff alleges merely hypothetical injuries, no genu-
ine controversy exists between adverse parties and, therefore, a fed-
eral court would overstep its constitutional bounds if it entertained
the • plaintiffs complaint." Because such overreaching implicates
separation-of-powers concerns, the U.S. Supreme Court grounds its
current standing doctrine in the concept of separation of powers. 45 By
limiting access solely to litigants alleging concrete, personal harms,
the Court avoids interfering with the political branches. 4° To prevent
such interference, the U.S. Supreme Court has established three con-
stitutional requirements for standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suf-
fered an injury in fact; (2) the defendant's actions must have caused
this injury in fact; and (3) a court could redress the injury were the
plaintiff successful on the merits. 47
35 See Jonathan R. Siegel, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905. 910
(1989).
•	 " See Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 973 (8th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
40 See infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
40 liorstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 1998); Eng-
lish v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir. 1979); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, § 2.5.1, at
60.
42 Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1278-79; English, 592 F.2d at 730; see CitEmERINsuY, supra
note 12, § 2.5.1, at 60.
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
44 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 564-67 & n.2.
45 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that "[t]he law of Art. III standing
is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers").
45 See id.
47 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. In addition to the above-mentioned constitutional stand-
ing requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified prudential requirements: (a)
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The injury-in-fact requirement is the central issue in determining
whether an alleged chilling injury is sufficient for standing. 18 The U.S.
Supreme. Court defines an injury in fact as "an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."49
 A particular-
ized injury is one that has a personal, individualized impact on the
plaintiff."
For example, in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sierra Club v.
Morton denied standing to the Sierra Club because it failed to allege
that any of its members actually used the land threatened by chal-
lenged development.51
 Because they did not use the land, the Sierra
Club's members could not have been personally and individually af-
fected by construction on the land. 52
 The construction thus did not
cause an injury in fact." In contrast, the Sierra Club was granted
standing on remand after amending its complaint to include allega-
tions that its members did use the land and would be affected by the
construction.54
 For an alleged injury to be an injury in fact, therefore,
the injury must affect the party in an individual way, a way different
from its effects on others."
Although standing requires concrete injuries that are neither
conjectural nor hypothetical, in one oft-criticized decision the U.S.
Supreme Court found injury in fact despite an attenuated connection
to the contested activity." In 1990, in United States v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), the U.S. Supreme Court
granted standing to a student group that alleged that the Interstate
Commerce Commission degraded its members' use of city parks by
increasing rates for shipping freight by rail. 57 The students reasoned
that because the rate hike would make it more costly to ship recycled
parties may raise only their own claims and not those of non-parties and (b) the claim
must fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute or constitutional provision
at issue. CnEmEittNsitv, supra note 12, § 2.5.1, at 62-63. Because these are prudential
rather than constitutional requirements, they can be waived. Id.
46 See Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 973.
46 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
55 Id. at 560 n.l.
51 405 U.S. 727, 735, 741 (1972).
52 Id. at 735.
63 See id.
54
 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1 2, § 2.5.2, at 64.
55 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735-36.
56 See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1990).
57 Id.
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goods, recycling would decline. 58 This would, in turn, result in more
litter in parks, thereby lessening the students' personal aesthetic en-
joyment of the parks. 59 The SCRAP decision suggests that, at least in
some cases, the Court places greater emphasis on whether the alleged
injury is particularized and individual than on whether it is conjec-
tural or hypothetical.6°
Chilling effects are particularly relevant to standing's overbreadth
doctrine. 61 Unique to First Amendment jurisprudence, the over-
breadth doctrine provides an exception to the rule that parties do not
have standing to assert the injuries of parties not before the court. 62
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a party to whom a law has been con-
stitutionally applied may nevertheless challenge the law on the
grounds that it could be unconstitutionally applied to a hypothetical
third party. 65 Given this preference to err on the side of protecting
speech, commentators have noted that the procedural barriers cur-
rently faced by a litigant alleging chilling injuries can be surprisingly
difficult to surmount."
III. CHILLING EFFECTS AND STANDING IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of
whether chilling injuries are sufficient for standing in three cases.°
First, in 1972, in Laird u Tatum, the U.S. Supreme Court denied stand-
ing to plaintiffs who alleged that Army surveillance of their political
activities impermissibly chilled their exercise of First Amendment
rights.59 Although noting that even indirect effects on First Amend-
ment rights can be sufficient for standing, the Court held subjective
chills inadequate for standing.67 The Court left unanswered the ques-
55
 Id. at 688.
59 Id.
69 See id. at 688-90.
°IS& Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) ("The doctrine [of overbreadth]
is predicated on the danger that an overly broad statute, if left in place, may cause persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected to refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions,").
62
 Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, § 2.5.4, at 86.
63 Note, Standing to Assert Constitutionaljim Tertii, 88 HARV, L. REV, 423, 423-24 (1974).
64 See, e.g., Michael N. Dolich, Alleging a First Amendment "Chilling Effect" to Create a Plain-
tiff's Standing: A Practical Approach, 43 DitaxE L. Rnv. 175, 176 (1994).
65 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419
U.S. 1314 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
66
 408 U.S. at 3.
67 Id. at 12-14 ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.").
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don of whether objective chills are sufficient and provided no explicit
means to distinguish objective from subjective chills. 88
Although Laird left these important questions unanswered, it
does offer guidance as to what kinds of chilling injuries do not qualify
as injuries in fact 69
 In Laird, the fears that allegedly chilled plaintiffs'
expression resulted from the plaintiffs' unsupported speculation that
the Army could conceivably misuse the intelligence information to
the plaintiffs' detriment in the future." The Court thus looked not
only at the existence of an alleged chill but also at its cause." Because
the feared harm from misuse of intelligence information was merely
speculative, the plaintiffs' fear was subjective and thus insufficient for
standing. 72 Therefore, Laird indicates that speculative fears are not
alone sufficient for standing."
In 1974, in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, the U.S. Su-
preme Court next considered chilling injuries as a basis for stand-
ing." Like the plaintiffs in Laird, the plaintiffs in this case sought to
contest government surveillance." The plaintiffs, however, did more
than simply allege chill based on unsupported fears of future harm
from conceivable government misuse of intelligence information." In
addition to alleging a chilling effect, the plaintiffs in Socialist Workers
asserted that the government's investigation would discourage atten-
dance at a political convention, prevent active participation in the
convention, and adversely affect the employment of those in atten-
dance. 77
 The Court held these alleged harms sufficient for standing. 78
The plaintiffs' chill resulted from fear that surveillance would lead to
actual and imminent harm, rather than the speculative fear of injury
at some undetermined time in the future held insufficient in Laird.79
In other words, the plaintiffs had objective reasons to fear expressing
themselves freely. 8° Accordingly, the Court granted standing. 81
69 See id.; Dolich, supra note 64, at 179-80.
69 See 408 U.S. at 13-14; Dolich, supra note 64, at 179.
79 408 U.S. at 13.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 13-14.
78 See id.
74
 419 U.S. at 1317-19.
78 Id. at 1314-15.
76
 Id. at 1319.
77 1d. at 1316,1319.
78 Id. at 1319.
79 See Socialist Workers, 419 U.S. at 1319.
94) See id.
81 Id.
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Most recently, in 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
issue of standing based on chilling effects in Meese u Keen e.82 Meese in-
volved a California State Senator, Barry Keene, who alleged that the
labeling of three Canadian films as political propaganda chilled his
First Amendment rights by deterring him from exhibiting the films. 89
The Court noted that merely alleging a chilling effect without more
would be insufficient for standing under Laird.84
In addition to alleging a chilling effect, however, Keene provided
objective evidence legitimizing his fear that exhibiting films catego-
rized as propaganda would result in harm to his career by damaging
his reputation and consequently reducing the likelihood of his reelec-
tion. 85 This evidence included results of an opinion poll and state-
ments of a political analyst suggesting that Keene's reputation in the
community and chances of reelection would suffer from exhibiting
films the Department of Justice listed as political propaganda." Be-
cause Keene's fear was supported by objective evidence, in contrast to
the merely speculative fears in Laird, the chilling effect he alleged was
more than a subjective chill; therefore, it satisfied Article III's injury-
in-fact requirement.87
Taken together, the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on whether
chilling injuries constitute injuries in fact sufficient for standing indi-
cate that plaintiffs must show that the exercise of First Amendment
rights will result in harm," Further, this harm must not be merely
conjectural or hypothetical." Rather, the injury must be objectively
supported in some way by evidence that engaging in the protected
activity will result in harm." The Court has recognized objectively
supported harms such as damage to one's career, job prospects, repu-
tation, or to a convention's success. 91 Lower courts have questioned
whether the harm supported by objective evidence must itself be in-
dependently sufficient for standing. 92
82 481 U.S. at 972-77.
9 See id. at 468-69.
54 Id. at 473.
55 Id. at 473-74.
99 Id.
62 Meese, 981 U.S. at 973-74.
88 See id. at 472; Socialist Wake's, 419 U.S. at 1318-19; Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
99 See Meese, 481 U.S. at 472; Socialist Workers, 419 U.S. at 1318-19; Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
58 See Meese, 481 U.S. at 472; Socialist Workers, 419 U.S. at 1318-19; Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
81 See Meese, 481 U.S. at 473-74 (damage to reputation and prospects of reelection); So-
cialist Workers, 419 U.S. at 1316,1319 (reduced attendance and participation in a political
rally, and career•related repercussions).
92 See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
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IV. CHILLING EFFECTS AS A BASIS FOR STANDING IN
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Laird v. Tatum's requirement' that allegations of chill be accom-
panied by other evidence of harm led to two general interpretations
among the lower courts: (1) evidence of harm must be sufficient as an
injury in fact independent of any allegation of chill and (2) alleged
chill and evidence of harm may becoine an injury in fact in combina-
tion where the evidence of harm indicates that the chill is objectively
reasonable.93
For example, in 1984, in United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v.
Reagan, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that the exis-
tence of chilling effects is irrelevant to standing analysis. 94
 In then-
Judge Scalia's words, a chilling effect is the "reason why the govern-
mental imposition is invalid rather than ... the harm which entitles
the plaintiff to challenge it."95
 Drawing no distinction between subjec-
tive and objective chills, the court concluded that Laird dictated that
standing requires concrete harm separate from the chilling effect it-
self.% The plaintiffs in United Presbyterian Church simply alleged that
intelligence procedures outlined in an executive order chilled their
constitutionally protected activities without providing evidence of
other harm.97
 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs' complaint
failed to allege an injury in fact and consequently denied standing. 98
Similarly, in 1983, in Gordon v. Warren Consolidated Board of Educa-
tion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the chilling
effects resulting from an undercover police surveillance operation in
high school classrooms insufficient for standing. 99
 Although the plain-
tiffs alleged harms in addition to chilling effects—they alleged that
the surveillance had degraded teacher-student relationships, caused
reputational harm, and damaged future employment prospects—the
99 See, e.g., R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.Sd 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating that chilling injuries are sufficient for standing if based on objectively reasonable
fear of prosecution); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v Reagan, 738 F.24 1375,
1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that chilling effect is irrelevant to standing except as a
rationale for the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth).
94
 738 F.2d at 1379 (Then-Judge Scalia acknowledged, however, that chilling effects
were relevant to standing analysis in one respect: as a rationale for First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine.) .
95 Id. at 1378.
136 Id. at 1378-79.
97 Id. at 1377.
98 Id. at 1378-81.
" 706 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1983).
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court rejected these allegations finding them insufficient as an inde-
pendent basis for standing. 111° Although potentially at odds with the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Meese v. Keene, the view that
chilling effects are irrelevant to whether there has been an injury in
fact has continued support. 1 ° 1
In 1991, in Bordell v. General Electric Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit adopted the second interpretation—that a
chilling effect can constitute an injury in fact sufficient for standing if
evidence shows that the chilling effect sterns from objectively reason-
able fears. 1 °2 Under this interpretation, plaintiffs must substantiate
alleged chilling injuries with objective evidence."
Applying this interpretation, the Borden court denied a federal
laboratory employee standing to contest a security policy requiring
formal approval before making public statements." The plaintiff
failed to provide evidence that the policy had actually deterred him
from making public statements. 105 In fact, the plaintiff had made nu-
merous public statements despite the policy. 06 Further, the court de-
termined that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that his
employer would ever punish him under the policy, which the em-
ployer had subsequently amended to permit certain public state-
tnents. 1 °7 Because the plaintiff did not support his fears of future in-
jury by evidence making them objectively reasonable, he alleged a
purely subjective chill insufficient for standing under Laird.'"
In 1999, in Latina Officers Ass'n v. Safir, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit applied the same reasoning to grant standing
to police officers who sued to contest a department policy restricting
public statements by officers. 109 The plaintiffs provided evidence that
they had turned down speaking requests because of the department's
refusal to allow plaintiffs to speak and threatened enforcement of the
wo Id, at 780-81,
101 See Fraternal Order of Police v. Rubin, 26 F. Stipp. 2d. 133. 141 (D.D.C. 1998) (not-
ing that being deterred from exercising First Amendment rights "should be distinguished
from the actual or threatened harm that supports standing").
1°2 See 922 F.2d 1057, 1061 (2d Cir. 1991).
103 Id. ("A plaintiff must proffer some objective evidence to substantiate his claim that
the challenged conduct has deterred him from engaging in protected activity.").
1°4 Id. at 1058-59, 1061.
1 °5 Id. at 1061.
1°6 1d.
107
	 922 F.2d at 1060.
laa Id. at 1061.
109 170 F.3d 167, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1999).
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policy. 11° The court held this evidence sufficient to objectively support
plaintiffs' claims of chilling injuries." Thus, plaintiffs had objectively
reasonable chilling injuries sufficient for standing.' 12
Similarly, in 1999, in Rhode Island Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. White-
house, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted standing
to realtors who established a credible threat that they would be sanc-
tioned for using public records to solicit new members (an activity
protected by the First Amendment),II 3 The court stated that plaintiffs
must establish that alleged chills resulted from objectively reasonable
fears. 114 Determining which fears are objectively reasonable requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.115
Following this reasoning, the court weighed the totality of the
circumstances and concluded that they supported an objectively rea-
sonable fear of prosecution.I 16 Specifically, the court found: (1) an
intention to engage in protected expression and (2) that doing so
would result in a credible threat of sanctions.II 7 The existence of an
objectively reasonable fear of prosecution raised the plaintiffs allega-
tions of chill to the level of an injury in fact. 118 Accordingly, the court
granted standing. 119
Finally, in January 2003, in Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit supported the view that allegations of
chill constitute injuries in fact if objectively reasonable. 120 Mangual
involved a journalist threatened by the prospect of criminal libel
prosecution as retribution for revealing police corruption. 121 The
court concluded that recent prosecutions of journalists under the
challenged statute and polls showing that journalist association mem-
bers strongly feared prosecution under the statute established a
credible threat of prosecution. 122 In the plaintiff's words, the threat of
prosecution put him "in a catch-22 situation, damned if I do, damned
if I don't. Clearly, the alternative to not living under the risk of prose-
110 Id. at 170.
In Id. at 170-71.
112 See id.
113 199 F.3d at 30-33.
114 Id. at 31.
116 Id.
116 Id. at 31-33.
" 7 /d. at 31.
118 See R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 31-33.
118
 Id. at 33.
128 Sce 317 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 51.
122 Id. at 58-59.
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cution for libel ... is not to publish. But is this not a 'chilling ef-
fect?'" The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the credible
threat of prosecution and resultant chilling effect constituted an in-
jury in fact sufficient for standing. 1 24
V. CHILLING INJURIES BASED ON FEAR OF INJURY TO ONE'S SPOUSE
This Part considers the narrower issue of whether chill resulting
from fear that one's protected speech will trigger state sanctions
against one's spouse constitutes an injury in fact sufficient for stand-
ing. 125 Four federal appellate courts have considered the issue. 126 The
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded
that chilling injuries based on fear of injury to one's spouse were too
indirect to constitute injuries in fact."7 Most recently, however, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion. 125
In 1979, in English v. Powell, the first case to address chilling inju-
ries based on fear for one's spouse, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit denied standing to the wife of a public employee. 125
The wife alleged that her protected speech resulted in her husband's
demotion.'" The court concluded, however, that any harm she expe-
rienced was too indirect to constitute an injury in fact."'
In English, E.A. Shands was promoted to a management position
with the county Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.132 The promotion
resulted from a reorganization plan recommended by the County
Composite Board, on which his wife, Vera Shands, sat as vice-chair.'"
After the reorganization, W. D. Powell was appointed as Mr. Shands's
supervisor over Mr. Shands's vehement objections. 154 Despite Powell's
command to Mr. Shands not to voice complaints to the board, Mrs.
125 Id. at 55.
124 Id. at 59.
125 See infra notes 126-173 and accompanying text.
125 The Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have considered
the issue. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969,972 (8th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989,
998 (9th Cir. 1999); Horstkoetter Dept of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265,1278-79 (10th Cir.
1998); English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727,730 (4th Cir. 1979).
1 " Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1278-79; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
10 Int'lAss'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972.
I" 592 F.2d at 730.
1313 Id.
151 Id.
1" Id. at 729.
135 Id.
"a English, 592 F.2d at 729.
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Shands angrily complained about Powell to several board members.'"
Powell told Mr. Shands that further complaints by Mr. Shands or his
wife would result in Mr. Shands's immediate dismissal, and, three days
later, he demoted Mr. Shands. 136
Concluding that his speech was not constitutionally protected,
the court dismissed Mr. Shands's suit to contest his demotion.'" Mrs.
Shands had also sought standing to sue on her own behalf, alleging
an infringement of her First Amendment rights.'" Mrs. Shands ar-
gued that Powell's threat that he would fire Mr. Shands if Mrs. Shands
made complaints caused a subjective chill of her First Amendment
rights.'" She argued further that this subjective chill, when combined
with the "present objective harm" caused by Mr. Shands's demotion
and consequent decrease in the family income (which forced Mrs.
Shands to take a job) constituted an injury in fact sufficient for stand-
ing."° The court disagreed, finding Mrs. Shands's injuries too indirect
and speculative to constitute the injury in fact required for stand-
ing."' The court rejected Mrs. Shands's attempt to gain standing by
combining her subjective chill with present objective harm to her
husband's career. 142
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in 1998, in .Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Saftty. 143
Horstkoetter involved a suit by highway patrol troopers and their wives
contesting an order to remove political campaign signs from their
yards.'" Finding any threatened injury to the troopers' wives too indi-
rect to support standing for the wives' independent claims, the court
granted summary judgment, dismissing the wives' claims. 145
In Horstkoetter, the wives of two troopers erected political signs
supporting a candidate for county sheriff in their yards.' Pursuant to
a policy forbidding troopers from publicly displaying political mate-
186 Id. at 730.
156 Id. The morning after his wile complained to a board member, Mr. Shands, fearing
that he would be fired, requested reassignment as a liquor store manager or, alternatively,
a liquor store clerk.
137 Id. at 731.
iss rd. at 730.




143 159 F.3d at 1278-80.
144 Id. at 1269.
145 Id. at 1279-80.
145
 Id. at 1269.
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rial, supervisors threatened the troopers with discipline or termina-
tion unless the signs were removed, regardless of who erected them. 147
Consequently, the wives removed the signs. 148 After an exchange of
letters with the highway patrol regarding the policy, the troopers and
their wives sued. 149
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the highway patrol policy constitutionally restricted the troopers'
speech and denied the troopers' spouses standing to pursue claims
independent of the troopers' claims.'" The court held that the wives
were harmed only indirectly because they could not have been di-
rectly subject to disciplinary action.'" The wives' chilling injuries,
coupled with direct harm to their husbands and indirect harm to
themselves, did not constitute injuries in fact required for standing.'"
Next, in 1999, in Biggs v. Best, Best & Kreiger, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied standing to the husband and daughter of a
city attorney fired as a result of the husband's and daughter's political
activities. 155 Julie Biggs was an employee of a private law firm that
acted as city attorney for Redlands, California.'" Her husband and
daughter were active in local politics and had campaigned for the re-
call of the mayor of Redlands, 155 As a result of the husband's and
daughter's political activities, a city councilman demanded that the
Biggs family be "silenced in Redlands community politics" or the city
would fire the law firm. 156 As a result, the firm told Julie Biggs to limit
her family's political involvement and informed her that she was now
out of consideration for partnership at the firm.'" The family then
sued the city council. 158 The firm fired Julie Biggs. 1 "
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that fear of negative repercus-
sions to Biggs's career restrained the political activities of Biggs's hus-
band and daughter. 16° Employment-related sanctions threatened
347 1d.
148 Horsthoetter, 159 F.3d at 1269.
149 Id. at 1269-70.




155 189 F.3d at 998-99.
154





Biggs, 189 F.3d at 992.
159 Id.
116 Id. at 997-98.
162	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:147
against Julie Biggs forced her husband and daughter to make a
difficult choice.m They had to choose between jeopardizing Biggs's
position, which financially benefited the entire family, and engaging
in protected political speech.'"
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit court denied the husband and
daughter standing to assert First Amendment claims of their own.'"
The court found that because the husband and daughter were not
directly threatened with sanctions, their injuries were indirect.'"
These indirect injuries were sufficient only to allow claims derivative
of Julie Biggs's claim.'" Because Julie Biggs's claims failed, so did
those of her family.'
In contrast, in 2002, in International ASS'11 of Firefighters, Local 2665
v. City of Ferguson, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted
standing to assert chilling injuries to the spouse of a public em-
ployee.'" International Ass'ii of Firefighters involved First Amendment
challenges brought by a public employee and his wife against a provi-
sion in the town charter that prohibited the public employee from
engaging, even indirectly, in local political campaigns.'" The Eighth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the provision as applied to the
employee.'" In contrast to the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
however, the court concluded that the employee's wife had standing
to independently challenge the provision.'" The court noted that if
the wife's political activities resulted in the state firing or disciplining
her husband, the resultant decrease in income would have a negative
economic effect on her. 171 Further, the wife was injured by forgoing or
hesitating to engage in protected speech to avoid these financial con-
sequences.'" The court then determined that this was a "real and
161 See id.
162 see id.
163 Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998-99.
164
 See id. at 998.
10 Id.
166 Id. at 999.
167 283 F.3d at 975,
166 Id. at 971.
169
 Id. at 972.
170 Id. at 975.
in Id. at 973.
172 Intl Ass 'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 973. In the court's words, the wife is herself in-
jured by having to give up, or hesitating to exercise, her First Amendment rights, and by
the consequent loss of her husband's ability to provide the mutual support that the law
imposes as a duty on both spouses: Id.
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tangible" injury and thus constituted an injury in fact sufficient for
standing.'"
VI. ANALYSIS
When the spouse of a public employee forgoes or hesitates to en-
gage in protected speech out of fear that doing so will result in direct,
employment-related sanctions against the public • employee, the
spouse has suffered an injury to rights protected by the First Amend-
ment. 174
 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits have disagreed, however, as to whether and under
what circumstances this injury is sufficient for standing. 175
 This dis-
agreement is due to inconsistent'case law on chilling injuries as a basis
for standing.'"
Conflicting interpretations of the few U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions to address whether chilling injuries constitute injuries in fact
sufficient for standing have resulted in two competing tests.'" The
first, referred to herein as the independent injury test, requires evi-
dence of injury independently sufficient for standing; the existence of
chill is irrelevant.'" The second, referred to herein as the objectively
reasonable test, recognizes chilling injuries as injuries in 'fact only if
based on objectively reasonable fears.'" Parts VI.A and Vl.B analyze
each of these two tests in turn and argue that neither is entirely satis-
factory.'8° Part VI.0 proposes an alternative, the choice test, which
focuses on the choice the challenged government action forced the
plaintiff to make. 181
 The choice test provides appropriate and neces-
sary safeguards of First Amendment rights while denying standing on
the basis of the mere subjective chills held insufficient for standing by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Laird v. Tatam. 182
173 Id. at 975.
174 Intl Ass'n of Firelighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969,973 (8th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
173 See id.; Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989,998 (9th Cir. 1999); Horstkoetter
v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265,1278-79 (10th Cir. 1998); English ‘r. Powell. 592 F.2d
727,730 (4th Cir. 1979).
178 See supra notes 65-173 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
1. 78
 This view is best described in United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738
F.2d 1375,1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
09 See, e.g., R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26,30-33 (1st Cir. 1999);
see also supra notes 102-124 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 183-220 and accompanying text.
181 See infra notes 221-250 and accompanying text.
' 82 See infra notes 221-250 and accompanying text.
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A. The Independent Injury Test Inadequately Protects First Amendment Rights
and Is Inconsistent with the Overbreadth Doctrine
The view favored by then Judge Scalia in United Presbyterian Church
in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, that chill is irrelevant to standing analysis ex-
cept as part of the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth, is
flawed. 183
 The requirement of an injury in fact independent of chill is
inconsistent with the rationale for the overbreadth doctrine and fails
to adequately protect the precious and vulnerable right to free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 184 The free flow of ideas, and
political speech in particular, are essential elements of the Framers'
constitutional vision) Recognizing that First Amendment rights are
precious but vulnerable, courts have established unique safeguards
for them.18° Ignoring the presence of chilling injuries for standing
purposes is inconsistent with the existence of these safeguards be-
cause deterrents as well as direct abridgements can equally impair the
free flow of ideas. 187
One of these safeguards is the First Amendment doctrine of
overbreadth. 188
 This doctrine enables litigants whose speech is per-
missibly abridged to contest the constitutionality of government ac-
tion on the basis that it may impermissibly chill the rights of hypo-
thetical third parties. 189 By allowing an exception to normal
requirements for standing, overbreadth doctrine recognizes that chill-
ing injuries present a serious danger to First Amendment freedoms.' 9°
It would be inconsistent, however, to grant strangers standing to raise
the chilling injuries of parties not before the court under overbreadth
doctrine, while simultaneously denying standing to plaintiffs alleging
their own chilling injuries. 191 But that is exactly what the independent
injury test does. 192 The independent injury test denies standing to
parties chilled by government action unless they can show some inde-
pendent injury in fact apart from the chilling injury. 193
 In contrast,
the overbreadth doctrine grants strangers standing to raise the same
183 See 738 F.2d at 1378-79.
184 See id.
186 See Schauer, supra note 17, at 693-94.
186 See Fallon, supra note 37, at 867-68.
187 See Schauer, supra note 17, at 693-94.
169 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
190 See Fallon, supra note 37, at 867-68.
191 See id.
192 See United Presbyterian Church, 738 F.2d at 1378-79.
193 Id.
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chilling injuries found insufficient for standing when raised by chilled
parties themselves. 194
Because the overbreadth doctrine presupposes that the chill of
First Amendment rights is itself a serious injury, courts should recog-
nize that chilling injuries alone can constitute injuries in fact. 195
Therefore, victims of chilling injuries should have standing to chal-
lenge government action without depending on the possibility that
other parties may challenge them on the basis of overbreadth. 126 It is
unlikely that the Framers intended to leave protection of such a pre-
cious and vulnerable right as free expression to the fortuity that a
stranger would take up one's cause. 197 They most likely intended
chilled parties to be able to defend their own rights,'"
B. The Objectively Reasonable Test Yields Inconsistent Results
Because It Focuses on the Harm Threatened Rather
Than the Resultant Chilling Effect
The theory that chilling effects can be injuries in fact—and thus
sufficient for standing—if caused by objectively reasonable fears rec-
ognizes that deterring protected speech can inflict injury. 129 By focus-
ing on evidence of objective harm rather than on the chill itself, how-
ever, this test distracts courts from the effect of the deterrent on the
chilled party. 2" As a consequence, the objectively reasonable test has
yielded inconsistent results.20
For example, the plaintiffs in Horstkoetter v. Department of Public
Safety, Biggs v. Best, Best &' Kreiger; and International Ass'n. of Firefighters,
Local 2665 u City of Ferguson all provided evidence of objectively rea-
sonable fears of employment-related sanctions against their
spouses. 202 Yet, the courts in Horstkoetter and Biggs denied standing.203
194 See id.
195 See Siegel, supra note 38, at 918-20.
l" See id. at 920.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See R.I. 115.15i of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 30-33.
2°° See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998 (focusing on directness of harm instead of looking to see
if fear of harm was objectively reasonable); Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279 (same); English,
592 F.2d at 730 (same).
2° 1 See Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972-73; Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstkoetter, 159
F.3d at 1279; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
292 See Ina Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972-73; Biggs, 189 F.3d at 992; Hotsthoetter, 159
F.3d at 1269-70.
298 Biggs, 189 F.3d at 992; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1271-72.
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In Horstkoetter, the troopers' wives established that, pursuant to high-
way patrol policy, erecting political signs could trigger employment-
related sanctions against their husbands. 2" Moreover, the supervisors'
threats to discipline the husbands or terminate their employment in-
dicated that the husbands' supervisors intended to enforce the pol-
icy. 205 This evidence of threatened sanctions established that the
wives' fears were objectively reasonable. 288 Therefore, the resulting
chilling injuries should have been sufficient for standing. 207 The court
reached the wrong conclusion because it focused on whether the
sanctions threatened the wives directly or indirectly rather than on
the effect of the deterrent and the extent of the resultant chill on the
wives' desired expression. 208
Similarly, in Biggs, the husband and daughter established that a
city councilman intended to silence them by threatening to terminate
the city's business with Julie Biggs's employer. 209 They further estab-
lished that these threats resulted in damage to Julie Biggs's career and
to her eventual termination. 210 The husband and daughter thus
showed that objectively reasonable fears chilled their expression and
the court should have granted standing. 211 Like the court in Horstkoet-
ter, however, the Biggs court focused on whether the sanctions affected
the husband and daughter directly or indirectly rather than on the
deterrent effect on their protected expression.212
What the courts in Biggs and Horstkoetter failed to recognize is that
chilling injuries are indirect by definition. 2" A chilling injury results
from government action or regulation that deters speech without di-
rectly regulating 11. 2 " A direct chilling injury is a contradiction in
terms. 215 Requiring direct chilling injury for standing purposes thus
2°4 159 F.3d at 1269-70.
2°5
 Id. at 1269.
206 See id. at 1 269-70.
2°7
 See R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 31,
20° See Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279.




 Id. at 998.
213 Schauer, supra note 17, at 693 (stating that "a chilling effect occurs when individu-
als seeking to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so
doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity").
214 Id.
210 See id.
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closes the courts to victims of chilling injuries and eviscerates the con-
cept of First Amendment chil1. 21 °
In addition, the tendency of courts to focus on the directness or
indirectness of the threatened harm distracts courts from considering
the strength of the deterrent and the resultant chilling effect. 217 Indi-
rect threatened harms can exert a strong deterrent effect resulting in
injury to one's First Amendment rights. 218 To appropriately protect
these rights, the central inquiry should not be the directness or indi-
rectness of the deterrent, but its effects. 21 ° Under the objectively rea-
sonable test, the degree of indirectness of the threatened harm is
relevant to whether the fear causing the chill is objectively reasonable,
but the inquiry should focus on whether, and how strongly, the harm
threatened deters speech or coerces silence. 22°
C. The Choice Test Most Appropriately Protects First Amendment Rights
To determine whether an alleged chilling injury is an injury in
fact required for standing, courts should consider the choice forced
by the challenged government action: the choice of whether to forego
the right to protected speech or to suffer consequences from exercis-
ing the right. 221 This choice lies at the heart of every chilling injury
and an analysis of it provides a workable framework for deciding what
chilling injuries are injuries in fact sufficient for standing. 222
Because a chilling injury involves a choice between two alterna-
tives—to forego speech or suffer consequences—evaluating the choice
requires considering both. 223 Analyzing the choice thus involves con-
sideration of objective factors relevant to each alternative: (a) factors
relating to the desired expression and (b) factors relating to the deter-
rent. 224 Factors relating to the desired expression include the nature
and social value of the expression and evidence of the plaintiffs desire
216 See id.
217 See, e.g., Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998.
216 See, e.g., Int7Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 972-73 (wife deterred from engaging in
local politics out of fear that doing so would cause employment-related sanctions against
her publicly employed spouse).
216 See Schauer, supra note 17, at 693-94.
22° See R.I. Assn of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 31 (noting that a court should look at the total-
ity of the circumstances when determining whether a chilling effect results from an objec-
tively reasonable fear).




168	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 45:147
to engage in it.225
 Factors relating to the deterrent include the likeli-
hood, severity, and directness of the threatened consequences. 22°
Evaluation of the choice at the heart of the alleged chill would
appropriately safeguard First Amendment rights by recognizing that
deterrents other than direct government regulation or action may
cause abridgement. 227
 Focusing on the choice imposed would also
prevent courts from becoming distracted by questions of whether the
threatened consequences are direct or indirect. 228 The directness of
the consequences is relevant but only inasmuch as it impacts the
difficulty of the choice imposed by the deterrent.229
 In addition, be-
cause the existence of the deterrent must be objectively shown, the
choice test will, consistent with Laird, deny standing on the basis of
subjective, unsupported allegations of chilling effects. 2"
Although no court has explicitly used the choice test to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff alleging chilling injuries has standing, courts
have recognized that chilling injuries involve a choice between the
consequences of exercising protected expression and self-
censorship. 231
 For example, the majority in the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Meese v. Keene noted that the contested provision forced
Keene to make "the Hobson's choice" between forgoing protected,
political speech, on the one hand, and suffering injury to his reputa-
tion and diminished chances of reelection, on the other. 232
 Similarly,
in Mangual v. Rotger
-Sabat, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit recognized that plaintiffs should not be forced to make impossi-
ble choices.288
Applied to cases involving chilling effects alleged by spouses of
public employees, the choice test reveals that the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals appropriately granted standing to Alma Mendez-
226
 See R.L Ass'n of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 30-31; Schauer, supra note 17, at 691-92 (noting
that a chilling effect is most invidious where the underlying constitutionally protected
activity is positively advantageous").
226
 Sec RI. Ass'n of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 30-31.
227 See Siegel, supra note 38, at 908.
226 See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
229 See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1987); Mangua4 317 F.3d at 58; RI Ass'n
of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 31.
236
 See 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
231 See, e.g., Meese, 481 U.S. at 473-74; Mangna4 317 F.3d at 58; R.I. Ass'n of Realtors, 199
F.3d at 31.
232 481 U.S. at 474.
233
 317 F.3d at 57 ("Plaintiffs need not place themselves 'between the Scylla of inten-
tionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing ... constitutionally protected
activity.'") (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
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Thompson in International Ass'n of Firefighters.234 The Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, in contrast, inappropriately de-
nied standing in similar circumstances. 235
In International Ass'n of Firefighters, Ms. Mendez-Thompson had to
choose whether to (a) forego her desire to engage in local politics or
(b) jeopardize her husband's career, and the income it provided to
their family.236 Framed this way, it matters little that the sanction was
threatened against Mr. Thompson. 237 The threat of sanctions against
her husband as a result of her desired expression forced an intoler-
able decision on Ms. Mendez-Thompson. 238 Like the plaintiff in Man-
gual, Ms. Mendez-Thompson was in a catch-22. 2" Being forced to
make this intolerable decision was an injury in fact and thus sufficient
as a basis for standing. 240
In Biggs, Mr. Biggs and his daughter were forced to choose be-
tween (a) curtailing their protected political activities and (b) causing
Mrs. Biggs's termination and loss of her substantial salary."' As in In-
ternational Ass'n of Firefighters, this was an impossible choice. 242 By be-
ing forced to make this choice, Mr. Biggs and his daughter were in-
jured-in-fact and thus should have been granted standing. 243
Horstkoetter involved a similarly difficult choice. 244 Highway patrol
policy forced the troopers' wives to choose between (a) abstaining from
political expression by removing campaign signs from their property
and (b) the risk that their husbands would be disciplined, demoted, or
terminated as a result of leaving the signs standing. 245 Again, being
forced to make an impossible choice was itself an injury in fact and ac-
cordingly the wives should have been granted standing. 246
English v. Powell is perhaps a closer case. 247 There, Mrs. Shands
had to choose whether to (a) voice her displeasure about her hus-
band's supervisor or (b) withhold her conunents to avoid risking
234 See 283 F.3d at 975.
235 See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstbetter, 159 F.3d at 1279-80; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
235 See 283 F.3d at 974-75.
237 See id.
233 See id at 974.
239 See Mangual, 317 F.3d at 55; int'/Ass'n of Firefighters, 283 F.3d at 974-75.
24° See Intl Assn. ofFirefighters, 283 F.3d at 976.
241 See 189 F.3d at 998.
242 See id.
242 see id .
244 See 159 F.3d at 1279.
20 see id.
246 see Id.
247 See 592 F.2d at 730.
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harm to her husband's position.248
 The speech Mrs. Shands engaged
in was not political and thus was less valuable than the speech chilled
in International Ass'n of Firefighters, Biggs, and Horstkoetter249
 As a result,
her choice seems much less difficult and therefore would likely be
insufficient for standing.250
CONCLUSION
The few U.S. Supreme Court decisions to address whether chill-
ing injuries can be injuries in fact required for standing have left im-
portant questions unanswered. As a result, lower federal courts have
developed two incompatible tests to determine when chilling injuries
are sufficient for standing. Neither appropriately protects precious
and fragile First Amendment rights. The.first, the independent injury
test, requires a plaintiff to show injury in fact apart from the chill;
chilling injuries are irrelevant except as part of the overbreadth doc-
trine. This test is inconsistent because it grants standing to raise the
claims of hypothetical third-party victims of chill under the over-
breadth doctrine while denying standing to actual victims of chill. The
second test, the objectively reasonable test, better protects FirstA-
mendment rights because it recognizes that chilling injuries can con-
stitute injuries in fact. This test's focus on the threatened harm, how-
ever, distracts courts' attention to auxiliary issues such as the
directness or indirectness of the harm threatened. As a result, courts
have improperly denied standing to plaintiffs able to demonstrate
that their speech was chilled by objectively reasonable fears.
The alternative proposed in this Note, the choice test, would pro-
tect valuable First Amendment rights while yielding more consistent
results than the objectively reasonable test. The choice test recognizes
that at the root of every chilling injury lies a choice between self-
censorship and the threatened consequences of exercising First
Amendment rights. Focusing on the difficulty of that choice based on
objective factors will best enable a court to discern what chills are in-
juries in fact sufficient for standing. When plaintiffs can show that the
challenged government action forced an intolerable decision, they
should be granted standing. The choice test would grant standing
when government action forces plaintiffs to decide between forgoing
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their publicly employed spouses. Applying the choice test would thus
resolve the split between the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals.
JEREMY A.M. EVANS
